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Abstract
The rapid transition to cloud-based infrastructures has introduced a number of uncharted risks, threats, and challenges that are
faced by security experts. In particular, concerns surrounding the conﬁdentiality of information in cloud-based systems and the
existence of covert communication channels ought to be addressed.
In this paper, we outline a schema for certifying covert channel freeness in cloud-based systems. The proposed schema provides
an application of the formal foundation laid out in our previous work and is based on a strategy derived from the necessity and for-
mal veriﬁcation of the conditions for covert channel existence in cloud-based systems speciﬁed using the mathematical framework
of Communicating Concurrent Kleene Algebra (C2KA). We also discuss how the proposed schema can be used for identifying
ways in which an analyst may amend, modify, or redesign a system in order to make it more resilient to covert channels, and to
potentially certify it to be free from covert channels on the basis of the non-existence of the potential for communication amongst
its agents.
c© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs.
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1. Introduction and Motivation
The emergence of cloud-based computing has substantially altered the perception of infrastructure architectures
and models for software storage and development. It has quickly gained popularity and has enjoyed a recent thrust
into the mainstream. However, as the push for cloud-based computing surges, so do the concerns regarding the
security and particularly, the conﬁdentiality of information in cloud-based systems. The rapid transition to cloud-based
infrastructures has fuelled a number of uncharted risks, threats, and challenges that are faced by security experts1.
Cloud computing is an umbrella term that refers to a category of computing services, such as storage and soft-
ware, and denotes a model where an infrastructure is viewed as a “cloud” from which agents can access applications
from anywhere in the world on demand2. Such an infrastructure has been oﬀered by commercial providers, such as
Amazon, Google, and Microsoft.
Cloud-based systems are speciﬁc kinds of distributed systems of communicating agents. A system of communicat-
ing agents refers to any collection of interacting agents. Throughout this paper, the term agent shall be treated in the
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sense used by Milner3 where an agent refers to any system whose behaviour consists of discrete actions. In this way,
an agent may just as easily be perceived as a system process, component, or service, each of which are terms used in
the literature of cloud-based computing (e.g., Zissis and Lekkas1, Buyya et al. 2, Krutz and Vines4).
While there exists many concerns surrounding the conﬁdentiality of information in cloud-based systems, one par-
ticular concern is that of the establishment and operation of covert channels5. A covert channel refers to any commu-
nication means that allows an agent to transfer information in a manner that violates a system’s security policy6. In the
literature, covert channels have also been referred to as subliminal channels7 and steganographic channels8. Typically,
covert channels are hidden from the view of third party observers. Because of this, the use of covert channels often
results in third-party observers not even necessarily being aware that any communication is taking place at all. In this
way, covert channels provide a means for data exﬁltration, allowing for sensitive information to be leaked secretly to
agents for which the information was not intended. Particularly, one can imagine that in a cloud-based system, which
may be perceived as a complex infrastructure with many interacting agents, covert channels can be widespread across
the entire infrastructure. Furthermore, due to the signiﬁcant amount of resource sharing upon which cloud-based sys-
tems are built, system agents can utilise any number of diﬀerent communication mediums, channels, and techniques
in order to establish covert channels. This is consistent with the perception of covert channel communication given
by Jaskolka and Khedri9.
With such a signiﬁcant concern surrounding the conﬁdentiality of information in an increasingly popular computing
infrastructure, we ought to strive for mechanisms to eliminate or, at the very least, minimise these threats. Because
of the scale and complexity of cloud-based systems, the need for a systematic analysis for the existence of covert
channels is becoming increasingly important. Currently, cloud-based systems lack assurance of the protection from
conﬁdentiality vulnerabilities such as covert channels1. Such an assurance needs to be provided at the early stages of
the software development life-cycle.
In this paper, we outline a schema for assuring covert channel freeness in cloud-based systems. This assurance
comes in the form of a certiﬁcation. In this context, certiﬁcation refers to the ability to mathematically substantiate
the non-existence of covert channels in a given system. The certiﬁcation schema outlined in this paper provides an
application of the formal foundation laid out in our previous work10,11,12,13. Speciﬁcally, the proposed schema is based
on the speciﬁcation of cloud-based systems using the mathematical framework of Communicating Concurrent Kleene
Algebra11,12 (C2KA) and an analysis of the necessary conditions for covert channel existence10 at an early stage in
the development of a system, namely at the system speciﬁcation stage. Without discussing all of the details of the
formal speciﬁcation of cloud-based systems and the formal veriﬁcation of the necessary conditions for covert channel
existence due to space limitations, we focus on discussing the proposed schema for the certiﬁcation of covert channel
freeness. The process on which the proposed schema is based opts for an approach that aims to falsify the potential for
communication condition. We think that the proposed schema for certifying covert channel freeness in cloud-based
systems can lay the grounds for having systems which are assured to reduce the concerns surrounding information
conﬁdentiality and privacy in the cloud.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the existence of covert channels in cloud-
based systems. Section 3 presents the necessary conditions for covert channel existence in systems of communicating
agents. Section 4 outlines the setting, strategy, and schema for certifying covert channel freeness in cloud-based
systems. Section 5 identiﬁes and discusses how the proposed certiﬁcation schema can guide an analyst to amend,
modify, or redesign a system in order to make it more resilient to covert channels, and to potentially certify it to be
free from covert channels on the basis of the non-existence of the potential for communication amongst its agents.
Finally, Section 6 gives concluding remarks and provides the highlights of our current and future work.
2. Covert Channels in Cloud-Based Systems
In modern computer systems, covert channels are regularly based on obscure and unexpected uses of system
resources and functionalities. Covert channels generally arise from resource sharing and the ability to devise covert
communication schemes based on some shared knowledge about the system. In order to eliminate covert channels,
all contention for shared resources must be minimised and there must be enforceable restrictions on what agents are
able to know and communicate.
Cloud computing is based on a model where resources are shared. In particular, a number of agents share the same
computing resources at the network level, host level, and application level. Although the agents are virtually isolated
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from one another, the hardware is not separated1. Both the virtualisation environment and the resource sharing of
cloud-based systems allow for fruitful avenues for the establishment of covert communication channels. Many cloud-
based systems attempt to maximise eﬃciency by assigning multiple virtual machines to execute on the same physical
server. They also allow for “multi-tenancy” which is the multiplexing of the virtual machines of disjoint agents upon
the same physical hardware14. Thus, it can be conceived that an agent’s virtual machine could be assigned to the same
physical server as another, possibly malicious, agent. Furthermore, it is possible that agents can share virtual services
which can be used for covert communication. In turn, this provokes the threat that an agent may penetrate the isolation
between virtual machines resulting in potential violations of conﬁdentiality. For instance, due to the virtualisation
environment of cloud-based systems, they become vulnerable to cache-based covert channels5 and keystroke activity
channels14. Additionally, Salaün15 gave a description of covert channels in the Xen hypervisor virtual machine system
which has recently been introduced to cloud-based systems. In particular, these covert channels use the mapping table
between physical addresses and pseudo-physical addresses of the hypervisor to write covert information that can be
read by other agents in the system.
With the signiﬁcant amount of resource sharing that is required in cloud-based systems, the potential for timing-
based covert channels is dramatically increased. For instance, the constant time interval and varying time interval
channels16, and the marked packet timing channel9, pose a signiﬁcant threat due to the number of resources and
functionalities that can be utilised as the signalling mechanism. Furthermore, the threat of the existence of timing-
based covert channels is particularly evident since many cloud-based systems provide some level of reliability in
the form of acknowledgement-based communication (e.g., Mehmood et al. 17). The potential for agents to alter the
timing of acknowledgements aﬀords the ability to employ a wide-range of covert channel constructions in order to
leak conﬁdential information in a cloud-based system.
In addition to the above mentioned covert channel threats, the network architecture of cloud-based systems provides
another medium for establishing covert channels. Apart from piggybacking on common network protocols which
are used in cloud-based systems, such as TCP (e.g., Smeets and Koot18), covert channels can be established using
bouncing techniques which take advantage of third party equipment, (e.g., an arbitrary number of cloud servers) that
can relay information between the source and destination19.
Although we did not exhaust all of the types of covert channels that can exist in cloud-based systems, we have
illustrated that cloud-based systems aﬀord an ability to establish many types of covert channels which can result in
the potential for conﬁdential information leakage. For this reason, this paper outlines a schema for reducing such
concerns in the form of a certiﬁcation of covert channel freeness in cloud-based systems.
3. Necessary Conditions for Covert Channel Existence
One of the main challenges and ﬁrst steps towards safeguarding cloud-based systems against the threat of covert
channels is determining the necessary conditions under which a covert channel may exist in a given system. In
previous work10, we articulated a set of necessary conditions for covert channel existence. In a given a system of
communicating agents, if there exists a covert channel, then the following conditions are satisﬁed:
1. Potential for Communication: If there exists an agent acting as a source of information and an agent acting as an
information sink, such that the source and sink agents are diﬀerent, and if there exists a pattern of communication
allowing for information to transfer from the source to the sink through the synchronisation and sequencing of
events, then the source and sink agents have a potential for communication.
2. Constraint on Communication: If there exists conﬁdential information in the data store of an agent, then there is a
constraint on the communication of the agent and the agent can be a source of information.
The potential for communication condition considers the behaviour of the system agents and captures how in-
formation can be communicated by the agents in the system. It captures the ability to initiate an information ﬂow
from a sending agent to a receiving agent. Such information ﬂows may be established through the synchronisation
of events in the system via timed events or communication handshakes, for example. This kind of synchronisation of
events allows for the creation of a “pattern of communication” or simply a sequence of events that allows information
to ﬂow from one agent in the system to another. In essence, as long as there is a potential for information to ﬂow
from one agent to another, it is possible for a communication channel to be established and there is a potential for
communication in the system.
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Fig. 1. A cloud-based system with internal and external cloud agents with data stores containing conﬁdential information.
Conversely, the constraint on communication condition considers the knowledge of the agents in the system and
captures what information each agent can know and communicate. In this way, only covert channels aﬀording an
ability to violate the security policy employed by the system through the threat of conﬁdential information leakage
are considered to be covert channels. This is to say that if an agent does not know any conﬁdential information,
then regardless of any potential communication means, covert or otherwise, there is no possibility for that agent to
communicate any conﬁdential information to violate the security policy and therefore, under the deﬁnition of covert
channels adopted in this paper, there is no possibility for the existence of a threatening covert channel with that agent
as the source of information. Such an agent can only be an intermediate agent that relays information between a
source and a sink.
4. A Schema for Certifying Covert Channel Freeness in Cloud-Based Systems
In what follows, consider a system of communicating agents where each agent has an associated data store. Sup-
pose that there exists a security policy that speciﬁes which information from each agent’s data store is permitted to
be shared with other agents in the system. In this way, each agent has its own set of conﬁdential information. Fur-
thermore, suppose that the security policy explicitly forbids the communication of the conﬁdential information of any
particular agent to any other agent. Under this setting, we can equate this kind of system of communicating agents
to a cloud-based system where there may be a number of cloud agents, each with their own local data store and set
of conﬁdential information that should not be leaked to any other agent. Additionally, it is important to note that
each cloud agent can have information which is permitted to be communicated and shared with the other agents in
the system. It should be noted that a cloud agent may refer to both a client (external cloud agent) in the cloud-based
system, as well as any component, process, or service, (internal cloud agent) provided by the cloud itself. This setting
is illustrated in Figure 1.
4.1. A Strategy for Certifying Covert Channel Freeness
Assuming the setting outlined above, we outline the strategy that is taken towards the development of a schema
for certifying covert channel freeness in cloud-based systems. The general strategy for establishing a schema for
certifying covert channel freeness in cloud-based systems is a consequence of the necessity of the conditions for
covert channel existence presented in Section 3. This is to say that, if a covert channel exists in a given system of
communicating agents (e.g., a cloud-based system), then the potential for communication condition and the constraint
on communication condition are satisﬁed. This can be summarised as shown in Equation (1).
Covert Channel Exists =⇒ Potential for Communication ∧ Constraint on Communication (1)
By taking the contrapositive of Equation (1), we obtain Equation (2).
¬(Potential for Communication ∧ Constraint on Communication) =⇒ ¬(Covert Channel Exists)
⇐⇒
¬(Potential for Communication) ∨ ¬(Constraint on Communication) =⇒ ¬(Covert Channel Exists) (2)
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In general, Equation (2) illustrates how the necessary conditions for covert channel existence can be utilised for
developing approaches for mitigating covert channels in systems of communicating agents. In particular, Equation (2)
shows that if it can be shown that either of the necessary conditions for covert channel existence are not satisﬁed for
a given system, then it is not possible for a covert channel to exist in that system. It is through Equation (2) that
we form the basis of our proposed certiﬁcation schema. Moreover, Equation (2) highlights two fronts from which the
certiﬁcation of covert channel freeness in cloud-based systems can be addressed. First, ways in which the potential for
communication among system agents can be disrupted or eliminated by modifying and restricting agent behaviours in
a given system can be explored. Second, a study of how to restrict the knowledge of the system agents on a potential
communication path so that they are unable to know any fragments of conﬁdential information that can be leaked via
covert channels and then reconstituted by the receiver can be examined.
4.2. The Proposed Certiﬁcation Schema
Certiﬁcation refers to the ability to mathematical substantiate the non-existence of covert channels in the given
system. In what follows, this comes in the form of a formal veriﬁcation of the satisﬁability of the necessary conditions
for covert channel existence with respect to a given formal speciﬁcation of a cloud-based system and a given security
policy.
The proposed schema for certifying covert channel freeness in cloud-based systems is an application of the formal
foundation laid out in our previous work10,11,12,13. Assume that we are given a cloud-based system formally speciﬁed
using the mathematical framework of Communicating Concurrent Kleene Algebra12 (C2KA) which is an extension of
Hoare et al.’s concurrent Kleene algebra20 (CKA). C2KA allows for the speciﬁcation of the concurrent and commu-
nicating behaviour of agents in open systems with the notion of external stimuli coming from outside the boundaries
of the system being considered. This capability is integral when considering the need to specify cloud-based systems,
since the openness of the cloud is one of its central features. Cloud-based systems aﬀord the ability for many agents
to interact with one another without the existence of any clearly deﬁned system boundaries. Furthermore, the poten-
tial for communication condition has been formulated13 using C2KA. Because of this, C2KA provides the formal
foundation upon which the proposed certiﬁcation schema is built. The details of using C2KA for specifying systems
of communicating agents (e.g., cloud-based systems) can be found in Jaskolka et al. 11,12 and due to space limitations,
they are not discussed any further in this paper. Further assume that we are given a security policy for the given
speciﬁcation which identiﬁes the set of conﬁdential information for each agent in the system. Then, the schema for
certifying covert channel freeness in the given cloud-based system proceeds as follows.
Step 1: Formally Verify the Necessary Conditions for Covert Channel Existence. The ﬁrst step is to formally verify
the necessary conditions for covert channel existence with respect to the given security policy. The feasibility of
verifying the necessary conditions for covert channel existence was outlined by Jaskolka et al. 10. If it can be shown
that either one of the necessary conditions for covert channel existence are not satisﬁed for the given system, then a
certiﬁcate shall be issued indicating that the given system is free from covert channels. It is critical to note that only
one of the necessary conditions for the existence of covert channels needs to be shown not to be satisﬁed in order to
issue the certiﬁcation. Conversely, if both of the necessary conditions for covert channel existence are satisﬁed, then
a certiﬁcate shall not be issued. In this case, a report pointing to the behaviour or knowledge of the agent(s) which
caused the certiﬁcation to fail shall be provided. For example, such a report may include a list of all of the potential
communication paths or “patterns of communication” that can exist between the system agents. The purpose of such a
report is to point an analyst to ways in which the behaviour or knowledge of system agents can be amended, modiﬁed,
or redesigned, in order to falsify the necessary conditions for covert channel existence. It should be noted that the
details of generating such a report are not discussed any further in this paper.
Step 2: Amend, Modify, or Redesign the Behaviour or Knowledge of System Agents. The second step, which is
necessary only if a certiﬁcate is not issued in Step 1, is to determine if and how the system may be amended, modiﬁed,
or redesigned, in order to mitigate the potential for communication amongst system agents or to further restrict the
knowledge of some system agents in an eﬀort to work towards the development of a system that can be certiﬁed
to be free of covert channels. After such amendments or modiﬁcations are made to the design of the system, the
process can be repeated from Step 1 and the necessary conditions for covert channel existence can be veriﬁed again.
More details regarding how an analyst may proceed with this step with respect to the falsiﬁcation of the potential for
communication condition are provided in Section 5.
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5. Certiﬁcation Through Falsiﬁcation of the Potential for Communication Condition
As mentioned in Section 4.1, there are two fronts from which we can attack the problem of certifying covert
channel freeness in cloud-based systems. Recall that if the certiﬁcation of covert channel freeness for a given cloud-
based systems fails, then it means that both of the necessary conditions for covert channel existence are satisﬁed.
However, in order to issue the certiﬁcation, only one of the necessary conditions for the existence of covert channels
needs to be shown not to be satisﬁed. Because of this, throughout the remainder of this paper, we will focus only on
the front established by the potential for communication condition. This is not to say that the proposed certiﬁcation
cannot be tackled from the front established by the constraint on communication condition; it is merely that it is
often easier to think and reason about agent behaviour and the ways in which agents can potentially communicate
with one another, rather than thinking and reasoning about agent knowledge and what agents can infer through their
interactions. In this way, we simply reduce the problem of certifying covert channel freeness in cloud-based systems
to eliminating the potential for communication among system agents.
According to Section 4.2, if a certiﬁcate of covert channel freeness is not issued for a given system, then a report
indicating the communication paths or “patterns of communication” that have caused the certiﬁcation to fail shall be
provided. Given these communication paths that are possible in the given system, the analyst needs to identify ways
in which the behaviour of system agents can be amended, modiﬁed, or redesigned in order to eliminate each potential
communication path.
When examining how to amend or modify the behaviour of agents in a system in order to falsify the potential
for communication condition, it is important to keep in mind the goal of disrupting or eliminating the potential for
communication amongst system agents, while maintaining the normal operation of the system. It is obvious that the
elimination of all possible forms of communication amongst agents in the system (i.e., achieving a completely isolated
system) will indeed falsify the potential for communication condition and eliminate the possibility of covert channels.
However, it is just as plain to see that the resulting system would be rendered useless, since a central feature of nearly
all cloud-based systems is the communication and interaction of its agents. Instead, we aim to identify ways in which
we can certify covert channel freeness in a system while still maintaining its overall behaviour. However, it is noted
that this additional security may come at the cost of some other non-functional system requirements such as reliability
or performance. This becomes a trade-oﬀ that must be reconciled by the system designers in order to achieve the
desired system and its behaviour.
The problem of modifying the behaviour of agents in a given communication path in order to eliminate the potential
for communication has been studied in previous work. Speciﬁcally, we showed13 how the modiﬁcation of agent
behaviours in a communication path can preserve or disrupt the potential for communication in the given path. In this
work, the potential for communication condition for covert channel existence is formulated using the mathematical
framework of Communicating Concurrent Kleene Algebra12 (C2KA). This allows for the formulation of the potential
for communication condition to consider communication via shared environments, as well as communication via
external stimuli. In turn, this allows for the consideration of communication in open systems, which, as mentioned in
Section 4.2, is an important part of analysing cloud-based systems for the existence of covert channels.
Intuitively, the results that we have previously presented13 can guide an analyst in amending or modifying the
behaviour of some system agents so that there is no longer a potential for communication between some agents in
the system. As one example of modifying the system behaviour, consider a cloud-based system for which agents
issue transaction requests to the cloud and where acknowledgements are directly sent to other system agents after
a transaction has been completed. Furthermore, suppose that it is possible for agents to control the timing of the
acknowledgements that are issued to other system agents, thereby aﬀording the possibility to establish a timing-based
covert channel. In an attempt to eliminate the potential for communication amongst the agents in this system, while
still preserving its overall behaviour, it is possible to inject a ﬁltering agent that all of the communication between
agents must pass through, for example. The purpose of such an agent is to de-couple any direct potential for com-
munication between an agent knowing some conﬁdential information and an agent that is not permitted to know that
information. In this way, the ﬁltering agent can be used to issue acknowledgements immediately after receiving a
transaction request so that the system agents no longer have any control over the timing of the acknowledgements.
Such a ﬁltering agent needs to be carefully designed so as not to introduce new covert channels. However, as men-
tioned earlier, this solution can run into some practical problems. Since the proposed solution ﬁnds the ﬁltering agent
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issuing acknowledgements immediately after it receives a transaction request from an agent, the system agent cannot
conﬁrm that the requested transaction was in fact completed. Instead, they must simply trust that the cloud services
are functioning properly and completing the requested transactions. This highlights the point that in order to attain
higher levels of security, there are potential tradeoﬀs with regard to the reliability, and possibly other non-functional
requirements of the system21. Therefore, while some solutions for mitigating the existence of covert channels in
cloud-based systems can protect the system’s conﬁdential information and maintain its overall behaviour, they often
come at a cost of reduced system reliability and performance.
In some cases it may not be possible to eliminate the communication between some system agents while still
achieving some other high priority non-functional requirements such as performance or reliability. In these cases, as-
suming that it is also not possible to restrict the knowledge of the systems agents in such a way to falsify the constraint
on communication condition, it is clear that a certiﬁcation of covert channel freeness cannot be issued. However, it
may be possible to use the proposed schema to at least guide an analyst in redesigning the system in such a way that
the communication amongst system agents cannot proceed in an unexpected way which would thereby allow for the
establishment of a covert channel. As mentioned earlier, it is through these unexpected uses of system resources and
functionalities that covert channels are possible. For instance, an analyst may design the system such that agents may
only communicate via external stimuli in a form of message-passing communication. In this way, the analyst can en-
sure (via formal veriﬁcation of the potential for communication13) that there is no means to communicate via a shared
environment. Therefore, while the potential for communication condition is still satisﬁed, it then becomes possible
to observe the communication amongst these system agents to ensure that the security policy is being respected. For
example, in order to detect conﬁdential information leakage, monitors can be installed and conﬁgured to identify “pat-
terns of communication” on the communication channels available to the agents in a potential communication path
using techniques similar to those presented by Jaskolka et al. 22,23. Similarly, mechanisms can be used to de-couple or
deteriorate any sort of timing information associated with the communication channels available to the agents in the
potential communication path by injecting random delays similar to the approach taken by the NRL Pump24.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, without discussing all of the details of the formal speciﬁcation of cloud-based systems and the formal
veriﬁcation of the necessary conditions for covert channel existence due to space limitations, we outlined a schema for
certifying covert channel freeness in cloud-based systems. The proposed schema provides an application of the formal
foundation laid out in our previous work10,11,12,13. It is based on a strategy derived from the necessity and formal
veriﬁcation of the conditions for covert channel existence in cloud-based systems speciﬁed using the mathematical
framework of Communicating Concurrent Kleene Algebra (C2KA). We also discussed how the problem of certifying
covert channel freeness in cloud-based systems can be tackled by looking only to the falsiﬁcation of the potential for
communication condition. In this discussion, we pointed to existing work which can be used as part of the proposed
certiﬁcation strategy for identifying ways in which an analyst may amend, modify, or redesign a system in order to
make it more resilient to covert channels, and to potentially certify it to be free from covert channels on the basis of
the non-existence of the potential for communication amongst its agents.
The proposed schema for the certiﬁcation of covert channel freeness in cloud-based systems is a step towards
the mitigation of conﬁdentiality concerns surrounding cloud computing. It provides a means for assuring covert
channel freeness at early stages in the development of the system, namely at the system speciﬁcation level. However,
it is uncertain how the proposed certiﬁcation schema, in its current form, will scale to handle large cloud-based
systems with numerous interacting agents, each with a signiﬁcant amount of information contained in their respective
data stores, and being exchanged amongst them. In this paper, we looked particularly at a schema for formally
certifying covert channel freeness in cloud-based systems through an examination of the front established by the
potential for communication condition. However, it is possible to also consider the problem from the front established
by the constraint on communication condition. This would involve a formulation of the constraint on communication
condition, the formal speciﬁcation of agent knowledge, and the ability to reason about what an agent knows, or can
come to know, through its interaction with other agents in the system. This can be done using a formalism such as
description logic25.
In our current and future work, we aim to develop tool support that can aid in the automation of the proposed
certiﬁcation schema. This involves the automation of the veriﬁcation of the necessary conditions for covert channel
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existence, as well as the issuance of certiﬁcates. Additionally, as mentioned in Section 4.2, in the case when a certiﬁ-
cate is not issued, we look to automate the generation of a report indicating the reasons for failing the certiﬁcation.
For example, such a report can include an automatically generated list of each of the possible communication paths
between agents in a given system.
With the increasing popularity of cloud-based systems and the growing concerns surrounding security and privacy
in today’s society, the need for mechanisms for mitigating the threat of conﬁdential information leakage and subsiding
the surrounding concerns is more important than ever. The schema for certifying covert channel freeness in cloud-
based systems proposed in this paper is merely one step towards this goal.
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